Labor mobility is one of the main reasons why firms are deviating from the proprietary innovation model towards opening the borders of the firm for knowledge exchange with the outside. Not only have firms started to acknowledge the importance of inbound open innovation, but the outbound open innovation is becoming more common. Therefore, the question this research discussing is about the changes in the firm's labor mobility after the adoption of openness in its R&D strategy. Firm's strategic shift towards outbound openness allows for knowledge transfer to other firms, which could reduce the other firms' motivation to poach the firm's inventors. Alternatively, it potentially reduces the cost and perceived risks of inventing in the liberated fields leading to an increasing the participating firms in these fields. This upraise in the firms' activities increases the demand for the skilled labors with expertise in these fields and in turns increase the labor mobility. Using IBM's 2005 patent pledge, as a shock of outbound openness, I investigate the consequences on likelihood of IBM's inventors to leave the firm. The findings support the proposition that outbound openness decreases the firm's labor mobility. but the outbound open innovation is becoming more common. Therefore, the question this research discussing is about the changes in the firm's labor mobility after the adoption of openness in its R&D strategy. Firm's strategic shift towards outbound openness allows for knowledge transfer to other firms, which could reduce the other firms' motivation to poach the firm's inventors.
INTRODUCTION
Firm's inventors represent an essential source of its competitive advantages, especially in R&D intense industries. The tacit knowledge embedded in the R&D technologists is very valuable for the firm and inter-organizational mobility is one of the means through which it diffuses among firms through (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Song, Almeida & Wu, 2003; Singh & Agrawal, 2011; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010) . Researchers have been interested in labor mobility (Holen, 1965; Gallaway, et al., 1967; Burton Jr. & Parker, 1969) , especially mobility of inventors and its effect on knowledge dissemination (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, & Henderson, 1993; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) and productivity improvements. (Griliches, 1973; Keller, 2002; Song, Almeida, & Wu., 2003; Guarino & Tedeschi 2006) . Many researchers studied how labor mobility affects the innovation process and the knowledge flow (Fosfuri, Motta, & Ronde, 2001 ; Lewis & Yao, 2001; Oettl & Agrawal, 2008; Palomeras & Melero, 2010) . Dahlander & Gann (2010) respectively. Open innovation paradigm assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to market, as they look to advance their technology". Depending on the flow of ideas and knowledge, openness of the innovation model can be inbound or outbound. The outbound direction of openness practice is less common in the business world where most of the firms tend to favor the inbound openness in their innovation model. Not only have firms started to acknowledge the importance of the so-called "outside-in" knowledge flows (Chesbrough, 2003) , but they have also increasingly been opening up their innovation boundaries to the outside world (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2007; Tranekjer & Knudsen, 2012) . In the present study, the focus of the interest is on the outbound open innovation, where the public can freely access the knowledge of the firm, for no direct financial benefits such as royalties or inventors' Intellectual properties rights (IPR) in return for using the liberated knowledge.
This research examine on the effect of opening up the R&D strategy on inventors' mobility.
The effect of the outbound openness of the R&D model on the labor mobility could be in the direction of increasing the inventors' mobility due to the reduction of negotiation and transaction costs, like the payments for using technologies when licensing. It also might motivate other firms to get involved in businesses related to the opened up technological areas (Wen, Ceccagnoli, & Forman, 2016) . The company adopting open approach for its R&D faces the risk of inventors' poaching since they are more exposed to the market. On the other hand, one can argue that the effect could go in the other direction; meaning that opening the company borders and making the knowledge available for free or with low costs reduce the motivation of firms for inventors' poaching which is usually the knowledge transfer purpose. Making the knowledge available saves the firms from the efforts and costs of poaching and hiring other company's inventors. This is why investigating this case would be informative and conclusive for the decision about which parts of intellectual property (IP) should be open and how open they should be. Moreover, the current paper investigates the role of the characteristics of the opened up knowledge, besides, how they moderate the effect of openness of R&D strategy on inventors' mobility. I examine some firm-related characteristics of the knowledge such as firm's dominance and firm's involvement in a knowledge area. These variables exhibit the extent of the firm's power in this technological class and the importance of that technological class to the firm, respectively. Furthermore, two more factors related to the general characteristics of the knowledge area are considers. These factors are the cumulativeness of the technological class and the concentration of the knowledge ownership.
These moderation effects are supposed to give the firm insights about which classes to open up when deciding to adopt openness in their R&D strategy.
In order to address these issues properly, I employ a quasi-natural experiment where a company that has adopted openness in its R&D strategy at a specific point in time is used to observe the changes in labor mobility. International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) is as a very good case since they used to be known for their strict adherence to the closed model of innovation (Mayle, 2006) . However, IBM made a radical shift to the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003) by supporting open-source software (OSS) through many actions such as pledging 500 patents in 2005. By extracting the information about IBM's inventors and their patents from USPTO database, it was possible to detect mobility and investigate the implications of IBM shift to open governance of their R&D on the leaving possibility of their inventors. The results of the paper suggest that opening up the corporate innovation strategy, in general, dampens the chances of the outbound labor mobility. This finding provides firms with a possibility for maintaining and protecting their skilled R&D labor, additional to the aggressive options of enforcing their intellectual property, like patent litigation (Agrawal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009; Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agrawal, 2015) . Therefore, firms may find it beneficial to share their knowledge and to open up their R&D borders, in order to keep their inventors for their special value to the firm. As well, the knowledge characteristics, when reflected on the inventor's knowledge and experience, have different moderating effects on openness, hence, the firms that consider adopting openness should consider them. Fundamentally, when a firm decide to integrate more openness in their R&D strategy, but at the same time want to protect their R&D professionals, they should open up technological classes with high concentration of knowledge ownership, and technological classes, where they have low class dominance and low firm's involvement.
The rest of this paper is constructed according to the following; the next section discusses the literature related to the topics of openness of innovation process and labor mobility in order to set the theoretical framework of the study. Next, the research setting is described where I explain the methodology of the study in details. The later section describes the data, which is used for the analysis, and the measures used for the modeling stage. In addition, I present some related information about the history of the company, IBM, in this section. Then, the results section follows with some analysis and insights from the data. Finally, the paper ends with the discussion and conclusions section.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
By the end of the 20th century, the closed model of innovation has become less and less popular in the innovation management field. The closed innovation model is based on the premise that in order to innovate and remain competitive, firms should create and develop their inventions internally. In his book, "Open Innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from technology", Chesbrough (2003) discusses factors and phenomena that contributed to the erosion of the closed innovation model. These factors, namely, are the increasing labor mobility, the enhancing popularity of venture capital, the ease of knowledge dissemination between public and private institutions, and the increase in competition. These changes in the business environment have made it more difficult for organizations to exclusively and entirely rely on themselves in doing R&D, and, thus, have urged them to make the firm's R&D boundaries permeable, as the next solution for their innovation practices, Open Innovation model.
In the open innovation strategy, profits and benefits from R&D investments are achieved by improving products and services in product markets, while the technology markets stay free and open, with the companies contributing to the growth of the pool of the common knowledge and even make profit from trading the firm's IPR (Gassmann, 2006; West & Gallagher, 2006) . Dahlander & Gann (2010) , in their paper where they re-conceptualize the idea of open innovation, define two types of outbound open innovation, pecuniary and non-pecuniary. The main difference is about the existence of direct financial benefits for the firm when revealing it knowledge. The focus of interest, in the current paper is on the non-pecuniary outbound open innovation when there is no immediate financial return, directly but that does not mean that the firm cannot seek indirect benefits.
The novelty of the openness framework is that it integrates the inflow and the outflow of knowledge where both sides of R&D market are active (Cassiman & Valentini, 2015) . Many prior studies on openness acknowledge its positive effects on the firm performance and the innovation productivity (e.g. Rosenkopf & Nerker, 2001; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002; Dodgson et al., 2006; Hung & Chiang, 2010; Cassiman & Valentini, 2015) . However, other studies argue that openness does not always lead to positive outcomes (Dahlander & Gann, 2007) . For instance, Laursen & Salter, (2006) , shows that an excessive usage of external sources may lead to an increase in the risk of imitation. For outbound openness, more specifically, Michelino, Caputo, Cammarano, & Lamberti (2014) claim that the performances of companies have a fundamentally decreasing trend versus outbound. Another study, by Wen, Ceccagnoli, & Forman (2016) finds that the strategy of opening up the IP results in an increased market entry, meaning more competition on the one hand, and a general economic growth, on the other hand. Empirical studies observe that firms carry out more inbound than outbound activities (van de Vrande, de Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & de Rochemont, 2009; Schroll & Mild, 2011) . Interestingly, the open innovation paradigm highlights the emphasis of the inside-out flow of knowledge; the current paper is one of the few studies, focusing on the outbound type of openness (e.g. Lewis & Dennis, 2001; Guarino & Tedeschi, 2006) .
How Openness Influences Outbound Labor Mobility
The labor mobility has recently received extensive attention in the literature and its impacts have been studied at different levels: individual, organizational, industry, societal, and global.
Moreover, employees' inter-organizational movements have been related to knowledge transfer and organizational learning, organization's relational aspects, market entry, innovative capabilities and other sources of competitive advantages. Employees' switching from one employer to the other, recognized as a means of information dissemination, has been shown to result in substantial spillover effects, despite the institutional levers for property rights protection. Although property rights are legally protected, it is almost impossible, in practice, to determine definite boundaries for protecting inventions, besides, it is difficult to provide an absolute distinction from other similar inventions (Aoki & Hu, 1999) .
Most of the research studying the relationship between labor mobility and knowledge transfer, assumes only a single direction of causality; namely that labor mobility affect knowledge transfer (e.g. Hoisl, 2007; Hoisl 2009; Kim & Marschke, 2005; Agrawal et al., 2009; Ganco et al., 2015) .
The predominant findings suggest that labor mobility contributes to an increase in knowledge transfer and an improvement of the quality of the innovation process (Fosfuri & Ronde, 2004; Moen, 2005; Agrawal, Cockburn, & McHale, 2006) . These studies highlight the importance of moving inventors in spreading spillovers of knowledge and ideas between firms. However, the effect of knowledge transfer itself, on labor mobility, especially outbound mobility, is an underexplored side of the process. Arguments can be made to support both possibilities, i.e. firms adopting more openness could face higher rates of turnover, or else, they could be more able to keep their inventors from leaving.
Costs and Risks Reduction Arguments. Scholarly work on the effect of the characteristics of the firm R&D strategy, specifically, the adoption of a tough and protective approach, on labor mobility, shows that generally, firms move toward more aggressiveness in their IP strategy, especially through patenting activities, in order to protect themselves from employees' high turnover rates (Kim & Marschke, 2005) . Agrawal et al. (2009) find that firm's history with patent enforcement decreases the level of knowledge spillovers that result from inventors' switching to a competing company. Moreover, Ganco et al. (2015) show that firm's reputation of litigiousnessbuilt by its actions reflecting IP toughness -actually slackens employees' exit decisions.
Therefore, by assuming a linear relation between labor mobility and the degree of openness or toughness in R&D strategy, one can extrapolate that openness and a softer IP strategy will lead to an increase in employees' switching jobs to other firms. Another potential channel for this positive effect is the increase of market entries which means that companies are getting more involved in the opened up areas of knowledge due to the reduction of transaction and negotiation costs like licensing costs and the reduction of the risk of infringement and litigation threats too (Murray et al., 2016; Wen et al, 2016) . Moreover, Openness of the R&D strategy may increase the market exposure of the inventors of the focal firm, which may make it easier to detect the talents and increase their chances of leaving the company.
Knowledge Transfer as a Driver for Poaching Inventors Arguments. On the other hand, there is another line of literature suggesting that firms, in fact, can use knowledge sharing/openness, as a response to losing key inventors. Lewis & Yao (2001) show through their model that even if the company adopts a closed model for R&D with no knowledge disclosure, there is a chance for information leakage from the company to its rivals, especially through poaching of the inventors.
The authors also argue that openness can be a possible way to decelerate inventors' poaching by other firms. They claim that there are opposing preferences for openness between the firms and engineers, and that firms prefer more closed approaches to earn their share of rents and to protect their knowledge capital. However, due to contractual incompleteness, the authors show that it is efficient for the firms to settle for a certain degree of openness in their R&D environment and to accept a certain level of turnover, which they call "Efficient Open-Constrained Equilibria". In a similar vein, Guarino & Tedeschi (2006) claim "knowledge transmission is a way to avoid labor poaching". They argue that, in equilibrium, some firms may choose to share their knowledge with the outside parties, as a mechanism to attenuate the "stealing" of their specialized workers. The argument is based on the assumption that information leakage, spillovers, can happen voluntarily, -by opening firm borders, -or involuntarily, -by labor movement; -and these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In other words, by opening up their knowledge, firms may avoid further losing their valued employees. One potential mechanism of this effect is that, by opening up the R&D strategy, the other firms do not have the same need or motivation to poach the other firm's inventors since the knowledge is available and free. This point of view finds substantial support in the literature (Von Hippel, 1988; Almeida & Kogut, 1999) . Potentially, it can be explained from the social motivations point of view, suggesting that inventors like to share their achievements with their peers to receive peer recognition as a reward (Sen et al, 2008) . Based on these arguments, firms adopting an open innovation practice are expected to be more able to keep their inventors in the firm. In other words, one could expect that the outbound labor mobility would slow down after the decision to open up the borders of the company. Taking into account both groups of arguments, I come to formulate the first hypothesis in the following way:
Hypothesis (1): The higher the openness degree of the company´s R&D strategy, the lower the likelihood of the outbound labor mobility is.
Interactions of opening up the R&D strategy with knowledge characteristics
In the labor market, the firms value the R&D skilled labor differently and the characteristics of the inventor's knowledge influence his value. For the labor mobility, the difference between the value of the inventor for his employer and for the other potential employers plays a big role in his exit decision (Palomeras & Melero, 2010) . The knowledge characteristics, that may affect the inventor's chances of changing employer, can be related to the general environment and practice in the market of a technological area, which are created collectively by all the active companies in the market, besides, they can also be related to the current employee strategy and practice in the technological areas. Putting it differently, these characteristics can be related externally or internally to the company. First factor I consider, which is one of the external factors, is the concentration of the knowledge ownership in each domain. This factor captures the degree of the power dispersion in an area of knowledge. The literature acknowledges that the characteristics of market structure with respect of being monopolistic or more competitive affect significantly the innovation process. Some researchers argue that monopoly is promotes innovation (e.g. Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990) . On the other hand, other researchers argue that competition has appositive effect on innovation (Baldwin & Scott, 2013; Kamien & Schwartz, 1982 , Cohen & Levin, 1989 . Mainly, I argue the increasing fragmentation of the knowledge concentration means that the firms hold relatively equivalent power and have similar attractive value for the employees.
Therefore, attracting inventors from a rival becomes harder and the firm is more able to retain its inventors. I hypothesize the first moderating effect in the following way:
Hypothesis (2): The lower the ownership concentration of the inventor's knowledge, the more negative the effect of opening up the R&D strategy on outbound labor mobility is.
The other observable dimension of the knowledge characteristics related to the external environment of the company, that I consider, is the cumulativeness of innovation. It is defined as how much an innovation relies on the previous knowledge of its own technological area (Green & Scotchmer, 1995; Scotchmer, 2004) . Cumulativeness of knowledge captures, at least partially, knowledge complexity and system embeddedness (Weigelt, 2009) . The knowledge areas with high cumulativeness are associated with higher costs of inventing around and building upon the previous patents, also associated with higher infringement costs. This leads to a higher risk resulting from poaching an inventor from another firm and using the knowledge he acquired at his original firm. The litigation risk increases with the cumulativeness of the knowledge of the poached inventor. Therefore, the negative effect of openness effect on outbound labor mobility is to be expected higher in areas with higher cumulativeness. I state the second moderator effect in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis (3): The higher the cumulativeness of the inventor's knowledge, the more negative the effect of opening up the R&D strategy on outbound labor mobility is.
For the internal factors of the focal firm's knowledge characteristics, I investigate the effect of the firm's dominance of a specific technological class, in addition to the company's involvement.
These two factors has been considered in other studies on labor mobility like in Hoetker & Agarwal (2007) and Palomeras & Melero (2010) . The company establishes its dominance in a knowledge area by creating a relatively high proportion of the new innovations in this specific area. Palomeras & Melero (2010) argue that company dominance in a specific technological class means a rarity of outside knowledge sources. Therefore, when a company chooses to open up a technological classes dominated by itself, its inventors' market value decreases in a rapid way because their knowledge made free for the public to use and its sources are scare outside the firm. Additionally, the high firm's dominance in a knowledge field implies that the firm is more attractive for its inventors to work in because the firm has better capabilities and chances for the inventors to advance in these areas. This leads me to expect that the mobility chances of the inventors with knowledge in areas dominated by their employer are less influenced by the openness of their corporate innovation model. Therefore, the hypothesis related to the negative moderation effect of the firm's dominance in a knowledge field is stated as following:
Hypothesis (4): The more the inventor's knowledge belongs to technological classes dominated by their firm, the less negative the effect of opening up the R&D strategy on outbound labor mobility is.
Another aspect of the inventor's knowledge is his employer's involvement in each of the technological classes the firm activities. This involvement reflects on the priorities of the company and its resources devotion for each area of knowledge. Usually, the knowledge, that is considered a core expertise of the firm, which the firm is highly involved in, is highly tacit and difficult for others to imitate and build upon (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007) . I expect to reduce the inventor's market value for the firms outside. Henceforth, opening up the core knowledge of a firm is less likely to make the company's inventors mobile.
Hypothesis (5): The more the inventor's knowledge belongs to technological classes which their company is involved in, the less negative the effect of opening up the R&D strategy on outbound labor mobility is.

RESEARCH SETTING
To address the research question proposed in this paper, I rely on a quasi-natural experiment and investigate the patterns of outbound mobility, by using International Business Machines Corporation's (IBM's) strategic step toward a significantly higher level of openness in its R&D model. The majority of studies on outbound openness has focused on the outcome of collaborations and/or licensing transactions where the knowledge transfer flows in both inward and outward the firm simultaneously (Collaboration case) or the firm has full control on who can benefit from its knowledge and it is not free. Therefore, the current study focuses on a purer form of outbound openness, which can help better understanding and disentangling the effect of outbound from the inbound open innovation. Specifically, I look at the trend of labor's moving out from IBM during the period from 1999 to 2010, in the middle of which the 2005 patent pledge, -the main event in the company's shift to more openness, -took place.
IBM and Openness
There are several reasons why the case of IBM provides an appropriate/good setting to study the effect of openness on labor mobility. IBM is one of the biggest research-based companies in the world and until now, IBM continues to be committed to open governance and in general, to the open-source community. A number of events in IBM's history have eased the shift of the company's strategy toward more openness. In fact, IBM used to be known for its strict adherence to a closed model of innovation (Mayle, 2006) . However, the company made a radical shift to the open innovation model (Chesbrough, 2003) by supporting open-source software (OSS), initiating programs and communities, such as Apache, Eclipse. In fact, as a response to the market share losses to UNIX and Microsoft Windows NT operating system (Chesbrough, 2006b) , IBM started to increasingly license its relatively underused technologies, and that served the company as a significant source of revenues over many years. However, the patent pledge of 2005, when IBM pledged free access to 500 software patents for the open source community, was IBM's most remarkable step toward openness. This event was dramatically different from any other major projects, due to the fact that the pledged patents were made public explicitly taking into account their considerable economic importance, as well as their coverage of multiple technological classes. Besides, pledging the patents meant that no formal agreement was required for anybody to use them. IBM's patent pledge announcement (2005) claimed that that patent pledge was by far the biggest contribution to the OSS, in terms of the number of the patents. The announcement (2005) also stated that "Fostering Innovation, Interoperability and Open Standards" were the goal of the pledge.
One interesting event, related to this study topic, is the crisis that the company faced in the early 90's. IBM, close to becoming bankrupt, decided to hire a new CEO, Louis V. Gernstner Jr., from outside the company for the first time in eight decades. The urgent restructuring and cost cutting in the first few years of his tenure were associated with massive layoffs of employees (see figure (1)), and write-off of corporate assets. By the end of the 90's, the company reached the sought stability and recovered its leadership in the industry. This sequence of events is especially important for the current study, as technically speaking, it allows to check for the effect of the openness of R&D on inventors' mobility, without much of noise from restructuring programs done by the company. In other words, the fact that IBM finished its short-term massive restructuring earlier than the treatment (the pledge of 500 patents for the sake of supporting the open source community) took place, makes the effect of openness of the innovation process on the outbound labor mobility purer and easier to detect. Hence, this study uses the patent pledge as a proxy for IBM's dramatic change in its IP strategy towards supporting and adopting open R&D approach.
MEASURES, AND METHODS
Data
Due to the lack of direct measures, empirically, it is not easy to detect the events of labor movements between firms. Many researchers have used patent data to detect mobility (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Song et al., 2003; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010; Palomeras & Melero, 2010) . Existing literature has recognized some shortcomings for using patent data to measure mobility. One of these shortcomings is the truncation of inventor's patenting behavior (Palomeras & Melero, 2010) . Truncation of inventor's patenting behavior means a) the inventor is not recognized as a mover until he files a patent with the new employer, b) besides, the year of the inventor's mobility cannot be accurately specified, since no information is available for whether he/she files a patent in the first or the coming years in his/her new job. In other words, the use of patent data can affect the accuracy of determining the exact point in time when moves take place (Ge, Huang & Png 2016; Melero, Palomeras, & Wehrheim, 2017) . Another downside of using patent data to observe mobility is that the leaving inventors, who stop patenting after moving, are not observed in the sample. For instance, the entrepreneurs, who start their own companies, are very unlikely to file patents, and therefore, will not be captured as leavers in this sample. After applying the restrictions and processing the data, eventually, the final sample consists of 454,475
inventor-patent observations with patent applications in the period 1999-2010. It includes around 54,800 inventors of IBM and its wholly owned subsidiaries, with expertise in different areas. For the cases, when the inventor has more than one patent filed at the same date, I order the patents randomly.
Variables
Dependent variable
Outbound labor mobility. In the current study, I detect mobility by following the patenting history of the inventors and the assignees, with which these inventors have patent applications. I collected, manually, the assignees of IBM and its subsidiaries to determine the inventors working for IBM. Technically speaking, the inventor is considered as leaving, once he starts patenting with another company for a long period of time, 2-3 years, without appearing to patent with IBM again.
To assure higher accuracy, I consider inventors that appear more than once in the patent records.
Besides, I identify as "false" mobility the cases of cooperation patents, where the patents are recorded under the name of the assignee, different from IBM, and do not consider them as moving out events. It is important to note that the technological classes that were not present in the pledged patents, have a zero for their "indirect openness".
Independent variables
Moderating variables
Inventor's concentration of knowledge ownership. The degree of knowledge concentration in each market is a key determinant of labor mobility (Noel & Schankerman, 2013; Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2011) . In a similar logic to building the openness variables discussed above, I establish a measure of dominance/concentration of ownership at the inventor level. Inventor's cumulativeness of knowledge. Studies claim that cumulativeness of knowledge is a factor that may affect mobility (Clarksin, 2005) . Cumulativeness of innovation refers to the extent to which the current innovations in a specific class are dependent on the previous knowledge of their own class (Caballero & Jaffe, 1993) . Usually, the patent "i" categorized in a specific class "j" in a certain year "t" backwardly cites other patents as references. These cited patents can belong to the same class as the focal patent, "nijt", or to other technological classes. The patents cited in the same class represent a proportion of all the previous patents in that specific class, "Nijt". For each patent, I calculate the proportion of "nijt/Nijt", after which standardize it by the application year. Clarkson, 2005 , has a slightly different approach, which is used in Wen et al. (2016) , too, mainly correcting for the fact that older patents tend to have higher cumulativeness, which might be for the reason that Nijt is smaller. In this paper, the correction mechanism is simply by standardizing with respect to the application year. After establishing an annual measure of cumulativeness for each class, I assign a number to each patent, according to its technological class and the application year. Afterwards, for each inventor, I take the mean of his cumulativeness of knowledge at each point in time of his filing a patent. 
Control variables
Experience. Most of the research in the labor mobility area includes individual's experience as a relevant factor. Studies on labor mobility are no exception. The variable Inventor's Experience is measured as the difference between the first time of ever filing a patent that was eventually granted, and the time of the current patent application. To account for non-linear effects, I
introduce the square of this variable into the analyses.
Number of patents.
This variable is the summation of all the patents registered under the inventor's name up to any specific moment in time. Number of patents is generally related to the characteristics of the inventor's knowledge. Many studies use it as a measure of quality and productivity of the inventors.
Number of co-inventors. This variable captures the difference between the inventors over time
in terms of the number of co-inventors. This partially captures how much of a team player the inventor is. Inventing through teams is one of the informal appropriability mechanisms.
Geographical location and time. The literature on labor mobility has established a strong link between labor mobility and geographical location (Almeida & Kogut, 1999) . As IBM has facilities in many different locations across the U.S., I introduce location dummies, by states. To control for other time changes, not accounted for in this study, I introduce dummies for the application years into the model. These factors that are time related can be internal or external, as such are factors related to the industry, the legislation process, or any macroeconomic factors.
Methods
The main goal of the current study is to check whether the increase in the amount/scope/value/breadth of the opened knowledge is associated with increase or decrease in the likelihood of the outbound mobility of the company's inventors. Following the approach from Palomeras & Melero, 2010 , the dataset produced is an unbalanced panel, where each inventor has T i events of patenting, when he is at the risk of moving out. Consequently, the hazard function can be written as:
where δ is the generic expression for the hazard rate of moving between t and (t+1). The functional form chosen for the baseline hazard function is logarithmic. The term Z t is the vector of time variant explanatory variables observed at t. The term μ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and u is a random variable that adds unobserved heterogeneity to the model and is distributed independently of Z and t. The term u captures the impact of omitted variables, particularly the inventor's personal characteristics (i.e., ability, education, age, gender, marital, status, number of children). To model the hazard rate in discrete time with time-dependent covariates, I use a binary response model (Yamaguchi 1991) . In particular, I use a Probit random effects specification, in order to account for the individual unobserved heterogeneity, caused by individual-specific omitted variables (Jenkins, 2005) . In addition, I perform the same analysis using a Logit model and a Linear Probability model, mainly for robustness checks. One of the concerns regarding the use of a panel data is the issue of heteroscedasticity, for which I use robust standard error estimates.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics
In their study on the effect of IBM 2005 patent pledge on new product introductions, Wen, et al., 2016 , compare the patents in IBM's pledge to a randomly selected group of similar patents in the market and conclude that the pledged patents have, in general, similar backward and forward citations, and that the pledged patents have lower number of claims. Similarly, they compare the pledged patents to other IBM patents, and find that the pledged patents have similar forward citations, but lower backward citations (indicating lower derivativeness) and lower claims (indicating less resistance to invalidation). In the current study, I perform other comparisons, whereas I find that the pledged patents seem to have higher forward citations in contrast to IBM's patent portfolio. The results are consistent both when using the normalized citations by the year of application and technological class, and when using the total number of citations. This comparison indicates that the pledged patents were of importance and quality, even before being pledged. Thus, IBM's pledging valuable and significant patents for the OSS community, is a sign of its strong commitment to the community. The classes, in which IBM chose to pledge patents, represent in total around 35% of IBM total patents with different percentages ranging from 0.06% to 3.42% per class. Wen et al. (2016) provide a comparison of the distribution of the pledged patents over the technological classes and the distribution of the total IBM's patents portfolio over the same classes and they tend to be very similar which suggest that IBM's support to the OSS community is consistent with its intellectual property right portfolio.
In terms of the number of inventors, the pledged patents have on average 2. IBM, with the majority of them contributing with one patent and the biggest contributing inventor appears on 9 patents in the pledge. As for the correlations among the independent variables, most of them seem to be normal and harmlessly low (see table 2 ). In table (1), I provide some descriptive statistics on the variable I use for the analysis at the inventor level. Table 1 about here.
--------------------------------------------------------Insert
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here.
--------------------------------------------------------Main Results
Results with the technological class dummy measure of openness. The presentation of the current study results starts with the simple measure of openness, as explain above, then proceeds with the other proposed measures. Table ( Regarding the moderation effects of the knowledge characteristics considered in the current study, the IBM class dominance and IBM involvement in a technological class have negative moderation effects on the indirect openness of the R&D strategy. This suggests that the lowering effect of opening up the R&D strategy on the outbound mobility is less effective when the inventor knowledge is mostly in areas where IBM is in a powerful position. IBM class dominance has a negative moderating effect on openness, potentially, because the company is expected to have more power in these fields to control its labor movements. Similarly, IBM involvement in a technological class, as a moderator on openness, has a negative interaction coefficient. This implies that IBM higher involvement in a technological class is associated with that class' being more trendy and popular, which is not surprising, considering that IBM is one of the biggest and most active companies in the world. The latter point with the negative moderation effect can be explained by the following: when IBM is more involved in a class that is also very trendy and popular in the market in general, opening up the knowledge in these classes makes it less appealing to other companies to poach IBM's inventors. These inventors are very valuable for IBM to give up to the competitors. These competitors are expected to be direct and close competitors, as they work in the same IBM's core technological areas, and IBM is expected to try to prevent these competitors from getting more engaged in these market trends by keeping its inventors. Mainly, these results provide evidence to support the second and the third hypotheses. Lastly, openness decision effect on the outbound mobility appears to be unaltered by the concentration of the knowledge ownership and the cumulativeness of the technological class, to which the inventor's patents belong. Both, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 are not supported by these results. With respect to the inventor's number of patents, IBM is more liable to keep the inventors as they file more patents. On the other hand, in my sample, the more experienced inventors are more disposed to leave IBM, but with a lessened effect, as the second order effect is negative. In other words, the experience has a positive but concave effect on the outbound mobility in IBM. Finally, the number of co-inventors seems to favor staying in IBM. Table 3 about here. The results from these settings (see table 4) support the observations made previously. However, one of the major differences between the two settings is the sign of the main effect of the indirect openness, measured by unweighted patents pledged count, takes a negative sign. Nonetheless, the interaction term with after 2005 follows the same direction, like in the previous settings. This finding reinforces the supposition that the decision of openness of the R&D strategy helps to reduce the hazard of inventors' moving out of the company when they invent in the opened up classes but it increases the leaving chances of the creators of the opened up technologies. Another difference between the two results is that the main effect of the Inventor IBM Class Dominance is insignificant. More importantly, the moderation effects are consistent between the two analyses. Table 4 about here.
The independent-claim-weighted pledged patents count as a measure of openness: As explained previously, the third measure of openness is a modified version of Wen et al. (2016) measure. I apply the same methodology to create the two openness measure for the direct and the indirect ones; meaning I use the independent claims to create the openness measures in this section.
This measure of indirect openness at the inventor level is correlated with the previous measure, the unweighted patents pledged measure of openness, with ρ = 0.6 and with the first measure by 0.344. Interestingly, the 10 models, created following the same procedures, reproduce similar results as the unweighted patent count measure of openness results. Nonetheless, there are few differences (see table 5) such as the interaction term between the direct openness and the after 2005 dummy is insignificant in this analysis, besides, the moderation effects of the IBM class involvement on openness and the concentration of knowledge ownership are insignificant, while the cumulativeness moderation effect is significant.
As robustness checks and for more evidence and support for my results, I used logit and linear probability models for the different models/settings described above. The results are consistent among all the methods. Moreover, the three different ways used to measure openness, besides the fact that I use panel data, even strengthen the robustness of my results. Table 5 about here.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As a result of opening up the corporate innovation strategy, resources become available for free to the public. This creates an opportunity for other companies to make use of the made-free resources, especially resources, such as intellectual property that are practically hard to defend and appropriate, creating a misappropriation problem for the focal firm. In practice, there are many different formal and informal mechanisms that firms use to deal with the problem of misappropriation, as such are the non-compete covenants, trade secrets, patents, trademarks, copyrights, confidentiality agreements, building reputation of toughness through litigiousness, and other methods (Jenero & Schreiber, 1999; Cohen et al., 2000; Kim & Marschke, 2005) . R&D labor mobility among firms is recognized as one of the main channels of misappropriation. Firms, especially R&D-intense firms, make significant investments in their inventors, and these inventors usually carry the firms' tacit knowledge. This is why firms employ various mechanisms to prevent inventor mobility or at least to prevent the inventors from exposing firm specific knowledge.
In the current paper, I claim that opening up the corporate innovation strategy, in general, hinders the outbound labor mobility. This finding provides firms with a possibility for maintaining and protecting their skilled R&D labor. Traditionally, firms have gone for the aggressive options of enforcing their intellectual property, like patent litigation (Agrawal et al., 2009; and Ganco et al., 2015) . However, the results of this paper imply that firms may find it beneficial to share their Previous studies find that more protection and toughness in the R&D approach reduces the likelihood of employees' exit decisions. However, this paper claims that more openness also reduces the outbound labor mobility. By constructing a scale capturing the R&D characteristics, where complete openness is one extreme and complete toughness and closure is another, the outbound labor mobility relationship with this scale is expected to take on an inverted U-shape. Therefore, out of the two possibilities to reduce inventors' movement out of the firm, the firm should decide which option to choose: going for more toughness or more openness. If the goal is to protect and maintain the human capital of the company, especially their stock of inventors, then the decision should consider the costs of the appropriability mechanisms; such as patent enforcements, litigiousness and other IP protection activities, versus the costs and hazards resulting from adopting more openness in the innovation model. Lastly, it is important to note that I assumed that openness in one class has no effect on the openness degree of the other classes. Thus, one can think of considering the inter-classes openness' interactions, especially the closely related classes, for future research. Moreover, this study cannot infer much about the effect of the adoption time (whether the company is an early adopter of openness in its industry or it is a late follower), and whether/how the adoption time would change the effect of openness on mobility. This is mainly due to the fact that I consider only one company in my analysis. 
